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Abstract
We analyze the role of board expertise in environmental issues (measured by the pres-
ence of non-executive directors with previous experience in environmental issues, EEDs) and
director networks on GHG emissions. Using emission data of FTSE 350 rms, we show
that the presence of EEDs on the board reduces GHG emissions. Also boards with better
networked directors have better environmental performance. These associations are robust
to alternative explanations - endogenous matching of rms and directors, general technical
expertise of the board, and pro-active stacking in board composition. The results are consis-
tent with the view that director skills and information spillovers through director networks
add value.
Key words: Director Expertise, Director Networks, Emissions, Environmental Perfor-
mance
JEL Classication: G34, G39, L14, L25, Q50
1 Introduction
Growing concerns about environmental sustainability has led to a large number of environmen-
tal regulations. These regulations aim to cut polluting emissions, phase out ozone-depleting
chemicals, or provide cleaner water. Their success is likely to depend on how the corporate
sector responds to these initiatives. Firms are under increasing institutional pressure to be
environmentally responsible and most countries have now issued codes of good governance on
environmental sustainability. Yet, there is little evidence on how rms internalize these pressures
or how corporate governance impacts upon environmental performance of rms. In this paper,
we examine the role of board expertise and director networks in shaping the environmental
performance of rms.
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The board of directors forms the "apex" of decision making and corporate control, primarily
tasked with monitoring and advising senior management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Adams,
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010). Whilst the monitoring role of the board of directors has been
extensively researched, recent work highlights the importance of the advisory role, specically
when directors have relevant expertise and when the regulatory environment is complex (Dass,
Kini, Nanda, Onal, and Wang, 2014; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008). This is particularly true
for environmental issues which are likely to involve large capital expenditures with uncertain
returns, are institutionally complex, and can have long-term value implications (Konar and
Cohen, 2001). Therefore, the expertise and networks of the board of directors and the governance
mechanism within a rm are likely to a¤ect environmental performance in many ways. First,
a director with environmental experience (henceforth EEDs) can narrow the information gap
between the board and the management (Pfei¤er and Salancik, 1978). At the same time, since
boards do most of their work through committees, rms are more likely to benet from related
expertise of directors if they have board level committees focused on environmental performance
(Adams, 2003; Billmoria and Piderit, 1994; Laux and Laux, 2009).
Second, in forming a strategic response to complex institutional regulations, rms can lever-
age knowledge across organizational boundaries, through the networks of individual directors.
We focus on the directors network formed by shared directorship: two directors are connected if
they sit on the same board in a given year. On one hand, boards with better-networked direc-
tors (i.e. directors with better-quality connections) are likely to have a comparative advantage
because they may have access to better information on environmental technology (Larcker, So,
and Wang, 2013). Firms can learn about environmentally e¢ cient production technology, their
implementation costs, etc. through their directorsnetworks. On the other hand it is possible
for value-destroying practices to be propagated through director networks: directors sitting on
the boards of many di¤erent rms spend less time on an individual rm, or engage in collusive
practices on environmental sustainability issues (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).
Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to answer the following questions: a) how
does board expertise a¤ect a rms environmental performance? and b) how do board networks
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inuence environmental performance? To this end, we use (i) greenhouse gas data (normalized
by the permissible thresholds of each type of pollutant) from the European Pollutant Release
and Transfer Register, as a measure of a rms environmental performance, and (ii) information
on the board composition and director networks of FTSE 350 rms from BoardEx. Our sample
comprises an unbalanced panel of 274 rms for the period 2006-2014. In estimating the e¤ects on
environmental performance of board expertise and director networks, it is important to control
for potential bias introduced by endogenous appointment of EEDs or better-networked directors
in certain rms. In addition to adjusting for rm and year xed e¤ects to mitigate time-invariant
omitted variable bias, we control for a range of rm and industry characteristics.
When investigating whether the presence of EEDs and board level committees on sustainable
issues a¤ect environmental performance, we also use two-stage least square estimation to control
for bias induced by time-varying unobservables. We instrument the appointment of EEDs with
a measure of supply of potential directors with environmental expertise. A higher supply of
directors with environmental expertise is likely to lower the cost of appointing such directors
on boards, but should not directly inuence an individual rms environmental performance.
We nd an economically meaningful e¤ect of having EEDs on the board, particularly if these
directors are members of board-level committees focused on environmental issues. To quantify,
when rms have environmental directors on board, GHG emissions are lower by 0.16 standard
deviations; and when rms have EEDs on environmental committees, GHG emissions are lower
by 0.19 standard deviations. These results are robust to di¤erent classications of EEDs and
board committees for environmental issues.
To address the second question, we use four centrality measures (viz. degree, closeness,
betweenness, and eigenvector) that capture di¤erent aspects of a directors centrality (or im-
portance) in the network formed by shared directorship. We then aggregate each measure at
the board level to get a measure of the board centrality and examine its impact on the rms
GHG emissions. We nd that better-networked boards have lower GHG emissions. For exam-
ple, a one standard deviation increase in the degree is associated with 0.20 standard deviation
decrease in GHG emissions. However, it is possible that this result is driven by endogenous
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selection of more skilled directors to rms with better environmental performance. Masulis and
Mobbs (2011) show that endogenous matching on director skills can drive the results of board
connections and nancial performance of rms.
We perform an array of tests to examine possible endogeneity in board composition and
director networks. These tests also allow us to examine whether the negative association of
boards networks and GHG emissions is driven by better access to information or better mon-
itoring. First, we restrict the sample to a subset of rms with unchanged board composition
from the previous to the current year. In the absence of new director appointments, the nega-
tive association of board networks and GHG emissions still holds. This could be due to better
access to network, or better monitoring through changes in rst-degree connections. Second, we
select a subsample of rms with no change in board composition and no changes in rst degree
connections from the previous to the current year. Again, the statistically signicant negative
association of board networks with GHG emissions still holds. However, this time, this negative
association cannot be explained by a better monitoring of directors on the board of the focal
rm: as rst and second degree connections do not change, these directors are sitting on the
same number of boards. The results suggest that better-networked boards are able to reduce
the rms GHG emissions through access to better information.
Collectively, the results suggest that board expertise and network have economically mean-
ingful e¤ects upon the environmental performance of rms. These results add to a few di¤erent
strands of economics and nance literature. First, it is related to the literature on voluntary
measures taken by rms on environmental sustainability. The prior literature has examined
the motivations of rms to participate in voluntary environmental management and climate
change programmes, and the implications for environmental performance (Anton, Deltas and
Khanna, 2004; Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler, 2000; Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011; King
and Lenox, 2000). These papers have highlighted the impact of rm size, protability, access
to nancing, regulatory and stakeholder pressures on the uptake on voluntary environmental
practices by rms. While it is widely acknowledged that environmental strategy is decided at
the board level, there is limited discussion so far about how the board governance a¤ects rms
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environmental performance. Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. (2012) show that board networks has a
positive impact on the adoption of proactive environmental strategies by rm. However, they
consider only one aspect of centrality (i.e. the degree) while we look at the impact of four di¤er-
ent measures. de Villiers et al. (2011) report better environmental performance for rms with
larger and more independent boards. Two other papers (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; McKendall
et al., 1999) examine the relationship between board characteristics and the number of viola-
tions of environmental legislation. Both studies document evidence of a positive relationship
between environmental violations and the combined stock ownership of corporate o¢ cers and
directors. In addition, Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) also highlight the importance of networked
boards, and nd weak evidence that prosecuted rms have directors with fewer multiple di-
rectorships. While these studies provide some insights into how boards a¤ect compliance with
environmental legislation, they do not consider individual director characteristics (i.e. expertise
or network centrality) that may help the rm pursue better environmental performance. A
key distinction of our paper is that we focus on the director level characteristics, like directors
skills and experience and network connections, that might a¤ect environmental performance.
Furthermore, we add to this literature by using a quantitative and comparable measure of en-
vironmental performance, i.e. the level of greenhouse gas emissions. Majority of studies use an
aggregated score-based measure (KLD) as a proxy for environmental performance (Di Giuli and
Kostovetsky, 2014). Whilst this provides a measure to ordinally rank order rms, it subsumes
the underlying distribution of emissions. Some other studies use negative environmental events
like oil-spills, government enforcement actions, lawsuits, etc. (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996;
Karpo¤, Lott, and Rankine, 1999; Konar and Cohen, 2001). These measures, whilst useful in
studying a particular type of pollution or an event, doesnt provide an objective and comparable
measure of rmsenvironmental performance.
Second, our paper is related to the literature on the advisory role of directors and directors
expertise. The nancial, legal, industry, and political expertise of directors have been well
studied (Güner, Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009; Dass et al. 2014).
These papers provide evidence that rms can benet from the related expertise of directors. On
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a similar note, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Masulis and Mobbs (2011) suggest that executive
directors can be concerned with monitoring and therefore conceal information. Specically, our
paper focuses on directors experience in environmental sustainability matters. We argue that
directors with specic skills related to environmental management can widen the information
set available to the board.
Third, we contribute to the literature on board networks. Existing literature studies the
e¤ect of director/CEO connections on nancial performance of rms (Hwang and Kim, 2009;
Fich and White, 2003). There is evidence on the impact of social network of directors on venture
capital (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007; Lindsey, 2008), managerial compensation (Hwang
and Kim, 2009), and lending markets (Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2003). Bizjak, Lemmon, and
Whitby (2009) nd that social connections between directors are positively associated with op-
tions backdating. More closely aligned to this paper is the bourgeoning literature on innovation
economics and corporate governance that looks at how rm investment into innovation is af-
fected by CEO types or characteristics (e.g. Acemoglu, Akcigit and Celik, 2014; Galasso and
Simcoe, 2011; Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006). For example, Gomes-Casseres et al. (2006) show
that innovations and patent lings are associated with board network connections. Our paper
adds to this literature in examining how knowledge ow through director networks a¤ects GHG
emissions.
Finally, these results are timely in light of the increasing mandatory environmental impact
disclosures for rms in the developed economies. For example, corporate environmental dis-
closures are receiving increased scrutiny by Security and Exchange Commission in the United
States. Similarly, under the Companies Act 2006, listed companies in the U.K. are required to
report GHG emissions from October 2013. In particular, these regulations makes the directors
responsible for the environmental impact of the rm. Such individual accountability is only
justied if directors are in a position to inuence environmental performance. We show that
through related expertise and networks, directors improve environmental performance in terms
of GHG emissions.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: in section 2, we describes the data and empirical
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strategy; section 3 presents the headline results, and section 4 concludes.
2 Data and Variables
In this section we discuss the data sources, variables construction and sample selection for our
empirical tests.
2.1 DATA DESCRIPTION
Our sample is taken from listed UK rms featured in the FTSE 350 index over the period 2006
to 2014. From Datastream we collect information on performance, size, risk in the operating
and information environment and industry classications. We augment this with information on
individual directors, board composition and board networks of these rms using BoardEx. Fi-
nally, rm-level environmental emissions data are obtained from the European Pollutant Release
and Transfer Register (E-PRTR).
2.1.1 Sample Selection
To be included in our sample, rms have to feature in the FTSE 350 for at least two consecutive
years, have the full set of board characteristics, and relevant nancial data available. With these
constraints, we have an unbalanced panel of 375 rms with 3328 rm-year observations.
From this sample we drop rms for which no directors have any network connections. We
augment the FTSE 350 sample with network centrality measures of individual directors using
information available from BoardEx. To calculate the network centrality of individual directors,
we use shared directorships from all quoted boards in Europe. As an additional sample selection
criterion, we require that rms have information on GHG emissions for all years (2007-2014).
This restricts our sample to an unbalanced panel of 313 rms with 4,143 rm-year and 18,098
director-year observations.
Finally, not all industries pollute through GHG emissions. We restrict our sample to rms
from GHG emitting industries only, and exclude rms in Financial and IT industries. Our nal
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sample is therefore comprised an unbalanced panel of 274 rms for the years 2006-2014 with
3,244 rm year and 16,212 director-year observations. Table I summaries the key variables of
the sample.
[Table I near here]
2.2 BOARD EXPERTISE AND BOARD NETWORK
2.2.1 Board Expertise
We identify three di¤erent sources of director expertise in environmental issues. First, we use
information provided by BoardEx on individual directors background to control for specic
experience in environmental sustainability. Following the sample selection protocol used by
Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009), we classify a director as EED if the job description of a
previous role contain keywords like "environment", "ecology", "pollution", "sustainable", etc. 1
Information from committee formations allows us to identify directors with experience on board
sub-committees that have an environment/pollution control focus. Finally, we use information
on awards for, and recognition of individual directors on environmental issues.2 It is possible
that we do not have complete information on environmental sustainability. related roles, and
environment related awards of directors, and this can be a likely source of attenuation bias.
In that regard, our results will be conservative estimates of the impact of these variables on
environmental performance.
For the purpose of encoding the environmental experience of directors, we use the subsample
of non-executive independent directors: individuals who are less aligned with management have a
lower incentive to maximise short term prots and are more likely to inuence the environmental
performance (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Johnson and Greening, 1999). Our measure of director
expertise (denoted by EED) is a binary indicator of environmental expertise which is equal to
one if any of the three measures discussed above is relevant to that director in a given year.
1All variants of these words is used to encode environmental experience. A complete list of these key words
are presented in appendix 2.
2Such awards include environmental leadership awards, global cross millennium awards for corporate environ-
mental leadership, etc.
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To give an example, independent non-executive director Patrick Grasby of Drax Group PLC,
an electrical power generation company, has previous experience of being on the environmental
sustainability committee in OPG Power Ventures group. He is therefore encoded in our sample
as an EED. On average a rm has 1.4 EEDs. We then aggregate this indicator at the board
level in the following way: we use a binary indicator (EED dummy) which is equal to one if at
least one director on the board is EED.
We then compute the aggregate supply of EEDs in each industry, which is the sum of all
directors with some environmental experience and sitting on the board of rms in that industry
in each year. From table III and Figure 1, the aggregate supply of EEDs has increased over the
years from 2010.
We also dene an indicator for the presence of an environmental committee on the board.
This measure captures the importance of environmental performance to a rm: a rm with a
board committee on environmental issues is likely to attach more importance to environmental
performance than rms that do not have such committees.
[Table II near here]
[Figure 1 near here]
An econometric concern of using environmental experience of directors is the potential bias
induced by assortative sorting. Two situations are plausible. First, the demand for EEDs can
be higher in rms (or industries) with higher GHG emissions. Therefore director appointment
with environmental expertise is likely to be more prevalent in high-pollution industries. Even
though this could induce biased estimates, such negative assortative sorting will only reinforce
the importance of director experience in environmental sustainability. Second, and more impor-
tantly, it may be possible that the supply of EEDs is constrained for high polluting industries,
i.e. out of reputational concerns, EEDs do not accept o¤ers from polluting rms. If so, the e¤ect
of EEDs on GHG emissions will be an artefact of this positive sorting mechanism. In table II,
we present the industry breakdown of GHG emissions and aggregate supply of EEDs. There is
little evidence of supply constraint of such directors in high-polluting industries like Energy and
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Industrial production: about 37.25 percent of all EEDs are in the energy and industrial produc-
tion sectors. The distribution of EEDs partially mitigates concerns about assortative sorting.
Nevertheless, we use a 2SLS approach, where we instrument the appointment of environmental
directors on a board by the supply of such directors in the same industry of the rm The under-
lying assumption is that rms appoint directors with environmental expertise from within the
same industry to leverage industry-specic knowledge. 3 The theoretical underpinning of this
approach is that if the supply of EEDs in the industry increases, the cost to rms for appointing
such directors decrease, but it doesnt directly impact upon GHG emissions at the rm level.
[Table III near here]
2.2.2 Board Networks
As discussed in section 1, we use information from BoardEx to build the director networks
that shared directorship gives rise to. For each year, each individual director is a node, and
two directors (or nodes) i and j are connected if they sit on at least one board k in time t.
The connections between individual directors dene the network. Mathematically, a network
is a square "adjacency" matrix where each cell indicates whether two individual directors are
connected. As we use undirected networks whereby the connection between two directors has
no directional character (i.e. there is no assumption on the direction of the ow of information
between two directors), the adjacency matrix is symmetric. Note that for the same reason as
for environmental expertise, we construct our network using information on the independent
non-executive directors only.
Our objective is to analyze how the relative importance or centrality of directors in the
network a¤ects a rms environmental performance. The concept of connections quality or
centrality is multidimensional. We focus on four basic dimensions widely used in the network
literature (see Jackson, 2010). The "Degree" or the number of unique connections to other
directors gives us the number of channels of information available to a given director. Second,
3 If this assumption is relaxed, and environmental directors are appointed from across industry classications,
the instrument will lack power in the rst-stage estimates.
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"Closeness" measures how easily a director can access information. It measures of the shortest
path between two directors. Third, a director is more central in a network if it connects more
directors. This measure, "Betweenness", emphasizes the role of a director as intermediary in a
given network. Finally, a director is also well-networked if he is connected to individual directors
who are also well-networked. Eigenvector measures directors centrality based on the centrality
of his rst degree connections. Formal denitions of these centrality measures can be found in
appendix 3.
To obtain a measure of centrality at the board-level, we compute average centrality measures
for all the directors on a specic board in a given year. In table III, we provide the time series
of our centrality measures at the board level. On average an individual rm is linked to 6
other rms (Degree) and this remains stable over time. The average closeness and betweenness
measures of our sample are also stable over time. Given that the time-series of the aggregate
network is stable, our concern that the empirical results could be an artefact of the secular
increase in aggregate board network is mitigated. In table II, we present the industry-wise
breakdown of the network centrality measures. Industrial production sector has the highest
degree and closeness. Eigenvector is the highest for the Energy sector.
There are a few econometric issues with using network centrality measures. First, larger
rms tend to have better-networked boards (Larcker, et al. 2013). We purge the rm size e¤ects
by regressing the four centrality measures on the log of rm size and the square of the log of rm
size, and using the residuals as size-adjusted centrality measures. Further, if board centrality
in the network is positively correlated with director quality, then our empirical test will simply
capture the e¤ect of better quality directors on GHG emissions. Ideally, an exogeneous shock
is required to establish the e¤ect of board network on GHG emissions. However, an exogeneous
shock to board network that doesnt otherwise a¤ect GHG emissions is not immediately obvious.
In section 3.2, we discuss our approach to address this concern.
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2.2.3 Control Variables
We use a range of rm and industry-level observables in our baseline estimates to control for
confounding factors (i.e. sales, board size, Return on Assets, board independence, etc.). For
example, appointment of EEDs and board network may vary by industry competitiveness, risk
in rms operating environment, and capital structures of the rm. Therefore in our baseline
estimates we control for industry competitiveness by HHI, volatility, and leverage.
Finally, to mitigate concerns that appointment of EEDs are non-random, we present univari-
ate di¤erences for all observable rm characteristics for rms with and without EEDs. Firms
with EEDs have larger boards, and lower centrality measures, and lower GHG emissions. How-
ever, there are no statistically signicant di¤erences for any other variables, like R&D expenses.
Univariate results are presented in table IV.
[Table IV near here]
2.3 MEASURING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
As a measure of rmsenvironmental performance, we use rmsGHG emission data from the
E-PRTR. The E-PRTR provides annual pollution data from more than 30, 000 facilities over
the period 2007-2012 across several industrial sectors. It provides data on releases of pollutants
to air, water and land as well as o¤-site transfers of waste and of pollutants in waste water from
93 key pollutants, including heavy metals, pesticide, greenhouse gases and dioxins. The main
advantage of the register is that data is comparable across countries and pollutants because data
collection and reporting is standardised over all pollutants in all countries (see appendix 1 for
details).
Pollution data in the E-PRTR is at the facility-level - where a facility is an operation unit
of a rm focused on a narrowly dened process like packaging, bottling, etc. To arrive at the
rm-level emission data, we aggregate GHG emissions for all European facilities of a FTSE 350
rm. This aggregation process requires multi-level matching. EPRTR reports the parent rm of
each facility. We rst aggregate the information of all facilities that have the same parent rm.
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281 of these parent companies reported by the E-PRTR are not publicly listed rms themselves,
but are wholly owned subsidiaries of listed rms. We map these subsidiaries to the listed rms
by using information available from Orisis. This matching exercise yields 89 unmatched rms.
We manually supplement the missing information on parent rms from publicly available news,
and drop from the sample where no information on GHG emissions are available. This leads to
omission of 40 rms.
We validate our matching algorithm by comparing our agglomerated GHG emission with the
GHG emission data available from Datastream. We use the ENERDP123 eld in Datastream
that reports the annual total GHG emissions as CO2 equivalents. By using our agglomeration
algorithm, we have improved upon the coverage of Datastream by 32.37%: on average Datas-
tream reports GHG emissions for 207 rms across the sample period whereas we could calculate
GHG emissions of 274 rms. The correlation of the GHG measure reported by Datastream and
our measure is 0.809. Given the wider coverage of our measure, we use our calculation GHG
emission data in the baseline regressions, and test for the robustness of our results using the
sub-sample of rms with GHG emission data from Datastream.4
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we examine the board level characteristics that inuence GHG emissions of rms.
We study two aspects of the board: the expertise of the directors in environmental sustainability.
issues, and the centrality of directors in the network formed by shared directorships.
3.1 BOARD EXPERTISE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
The central hypothesis is that the presence of EEDs on a board a¤ects the environmental
performance of rms. We present the results in table V with robust standard errors clustered
at rm level. We estimate the following regression equation:
4GHG emissions data for 2013 and 2014 come from Datastream because these years were not available in the
E-PRTR.
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GHGit = i + t + 
TExpit 1 + 
TZit +  (1)
where i denotes the rm and t the year. Variables are dened as follows: GHGit is the total
GHG emissions of rm i in year t (the dependent variable), i is the rm xed e¤ect, t is
the year xed e¤ect. Firm-xed e¤ects isolate the e¤ect of board expertise on GHG emissions.
Vector Zit contains various rm and board level control variables (board size, percentage of
non-executive directors, log of total sales, ROA, percentage of institutional shareholding).
The vector Expit 1 contains the variables of interest related to environmental expertise for
rm i in year t 1: the binary variable EED dummy, which is equal to one if at least one director
on the board has some environmental experience, the binary variable Environmental Committee
and the interaction term. As denoted by the subscripts, environmental expertise is measured
in the year preceding GHG emissions. In establishing an association between board charac-
teristics and environmental performance (and later for network centrality and environmental
performance), reverse causal associations whereby an individual directors with a background
in environmental sustainability. accepts positions in rms with better performance need close
attention. We try to mitigate this concern in the following ways. First, we lag the indepen-
dent variables by one year. This identies board characteristics that pre-date emissions by at
least one year. Second, our baseline estimates include year and rm xed e¤ects to control for
time-invariant unobservable rm characteristics that might simultaneously impact upon GHG
emissions and the appointment of directors with environmental expertise.
From column 1: the presence of at least one director with environmental experience on the
board is associated with lower GHG emissions. In column (2) we add the indicator for the
presence of an environmental committee on the board. In this specication, we are trying to
isolate the e¤ect of director expertise from the rms intrinsic focus on environmental issues.
Both director expertise and the presence of an environmental committee seems to be negatively
associated with GHG emissions. Therefore the e¤ect of board expertise on GHG emissions per-
sists after controlling for the importance of environmental performance to the rm. Finally, in
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column 3 we add an interaction of board expertise in environmental issues and the presence of an
environmental committee. This captures the e¤ect of appointing a director with environmental
expertise on environmental committees. In addition to environmental committees and environ-
mental expertise, the interaction is also negatively associated with GHG emissions. In gist, these
estimates suggest that board expertise on environmental sustainability. is associated with lower
GHG emissions. Firms with enabling mechanisms on the board in the form of board committees
focussed on environmental issues gain incremental benets in environmental performance. To
quantify: a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of EEDs leads to a 0.16 standard
deviations decrease in GHG emissions.5
[Table V near here]
A remaining concern is that presence of EEDs on boards can be sticky at the rm level over
time, and appointments of EEDs can be driven by time-varying unobservable characteristics
or shocks. For example, it could be possible that appointment of directors with environmental
expertise happens around other major changes in the rms. We nd in our sample, 77 percent,
72 percent and 70 percent of the rms that had at least one EED in period t also have them
in periods t + 1 ; t + 2 ; t + 3 respectively. Only 13 percent of CEO turnovers, and 7 percent
of M&As coincide with the change in rms status of having an environmental director or not.
This partially addresses the concern that unobserved shocks are changing both GHG emissions
and the appointment of environmental directors. It has been argued cases of time-persistent
regressors, instrumental variables regressions are preferred over xed-e¤ects models (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008; Dass et al., 2014).
To ensure that the baseline results presented above are not driven by endogeneity in envi-
ronmental performance, we estimate an IV-regression where we use the supply of EEDs as an
exogenous source of variation in the rm-level appointment of such directors. Our instrument is
Ln(industry supply of environmental directors per seat). The supply is measured by identifying
5The economic e¤ect is arrived at using the ratio of the standard deviations of EEDs and GHG emissions, and
multiplying this by the coe¢ cient of EED from column (1) of table 5. GHG emissions are expressed in /1,000,000
tonnes.
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and summing all EEDs in one specic industry. This is then scaled by the aggregate board
size in the same industry. A greater supply of EEDs is likely to reduce the search cost for such
appointments, but there is no obvious direct relationship between this supply measure and the
GHG emissions of individual rms. Moreover, the scaling by aggregate board size implicitly
controls for industry e¤ects.
[Table VI near here]
We present the 2SLS results in table VI for the just identied models. This is essentially
a Heckman-type selection model where the dependent variable in the rst stage is the binary
indicator EED. First, we check that the instrument is relevant in the rst stage regressions which
are presented in column (1). The instrument is positively associated with the board expertise in
environmental a¤airs, and this association is statistically signicant. Further, the F-statistic of
the rst stage regression is greater than 10, thereby mitigating concerns about weak instrument.
We present the second stage results in columns 2-4 with heteroscedasticity robust standard
errors. The parameter estimates of board expertise in environmental issues is negative and is
statistically signicant. Therefore our results do not seem to be driven by potential endogenous
selection of EEDs to boards.
3.2 DIRECTOR NETWORK AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
The second hypothesis we are testing is whether directors centrality in the network a¤ects
environmental performance of rms. We present the results in table VI with robust standard
errors clustered at rm level. We estimate the following regression equation:
GHGit = i + t +  Networkit 1 + TZit +  (2)
where i denotes the rm and t the year. Variables are dened as follows: GHGit is the total
GHG emissions of rm i in year t, i is the rm xed e¤ect, t is the year xed e¤ect. These
xed e¤ects are included to control for time-invariant unobservable rm characteristics that
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might simultaneously impact upon GHG emissions and network centrality measures. Vector Zit
contains same rm and board level control variables as in the previous section.
The variable Networkit 1 is one of the four centrality measures previously dened for rm
i in year t   1: degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector. As explained before, we use
size-adjusted centrality measures in all our specications, and lag the independent variables by
one year.6
We present the results in table VII, where in column (1) we present the OLS results with
Degree as our measure of centrality; in columns (2)-(5) we present the xed e¤ects estimates
with Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, and Eigenvector, respectively. We nd the rms with a
higher degree have lower GHG emissions, but this association is not statistically signicant in
the within-rm estimates. All other measures of centrality are negatively associated with GHG
emissions, and such associations are statistically signicant. To quantify, one standard deviation
increase in degree centrality leads to 0.19 standard deviations decrease in GHG emissions.
There are two possible explanations for how director networks may a¤ect environmental per-
formance: (1) nancial performance and environmental performance may be correlated. There-
fore more successful rms attract more networked directors; or (2) information spillover from
the board networks inuences environmental strategy, and performance. If director quality is
positively associated with the size of her network, this may bias our estimates with the centrality
measures (Masulis and Mobbs, 2012). In this section, we perform a series of tests to examine
the likelihood that our results are driven by such associations.
[Table VII near here]
We reduce our analysis to a subset of rms whose board composition did not change from the
previous year. This restricts the possibility of assortative sorting, whilst allowing for variations
in network centrality through changes in board composition of other rms in the network. The
results for the sample with this restriction are presented in panel A of table VIII. We further
6The reason why we dot include all the centrality measures in the same regression but add them one at a time
is that they are highly correlated.
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restrict our sample to rms whose board composition as well as rst-degree network connections
did not change from t 1 to t. Any change in the board centrality measures is likely to be caused
by changes in centrality of other boards. Results with these restrictions are presented in panel
B of table VIII. The results remain economically signicant, but vary in statistical signicance
due to smaller sample size.
[Table VIII near here]
These results could be due to two competing reasons. First, better-networked boards have
access to information. Second, sitting on multiple boards is a way of monitoring a directors
action because individual members are now exposed to more peers. Whilst we can not establish
a causal link, the empirical setting of table VIII makes some attempts towards disentangling
these two channels. In panel A, we report negative association of better-networked boards with
GHG emissions in a sample of unchanged board composition. In this sample, any variation in the
centrality measure is caused by change in the rst degree connections. Additional rst degree
connections are likely to simultaneously introduce better information and better monitoring to
the focal board. In panel B, we use a further restriction of unchanged rst degree connection.
This allows us to observe variation in the centrality measure through variation in second degree
connections. Changes in second degree connections are likely to increase the access to infor-
mation, but may not have a direct e¤ect on the monitoring of the focal rm. Therefore we
interpret the results of table VIII to be supportive of the view that better-networked boards
improve performance in terms of GHG emissions because of better access to information.
3.3 ROBUSTNESS
In this section we present the robustness of our results to alternate explanations and potential
misclassications. The results are presented in table IX.
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3.3.1 Alternate Classications of Environmental Directors
By our classication of environmental experience, we may be employing an imperfect proxy
of technical expertise. In other words, EEDs could potentially be a subset of directors with
technical expertise. If so, we should get a stronger e¤ect by using a measure of technical
expertise. From information on their education and career background we construct a measure
of technical directors where directors have nancial, engineering, legal and technology expertise,
in addition to environmental expertise. Using this measure of board expertise, we reestimate
our baseline specications. The coe¢ cient on this measure of technical expertise is negative
but not statistically signicant at conventional levels. Therefore, it does not seems that our
baseline results are capturing the e¤ect of technical expertise. Directors with specic expertise
in environmental experience seems to have an e¤ect on GHG emissions. The results are presented
in column (1) of table IX.
3.3.2 Impact of CEO-EEDs
Fich (2005) and Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010) show that rms can benet from appointing
directors who are CEOs of other rms. We identify the subsample of those rm-years where
there is at least one independent non-executive director who is a CEO of another listed rm.
Within this subsample, we identify CEO-EEDs. A large proportion of EEDs, (78%) are not
CEOs of other rms. We reestimate our baseline specications discussed in section 3.1 with an
indicator for CEO-environmental experience. We nd that presence of both CEO environmental
directors and non-CEO environmental directors are associated with lower GHG emissions. The
results are presented in columns (2) and (3) of table IX.
[Table IX near here]
3.3.3 Alternate measures of environmental performance
Whilst GHG emission is the most pressing of environmental concerns, there are other measures
of environmental performance that needs to be considered. In alternate specications, we test
19
for the robustness of our results using particulate matters, and e­ uent release as measures of
environmental performance.7 The results are consistent with our baseline estimates, albeit with
smaller sample sizes. These results are unreported in the interests of brevity but are available
upon request.
4 Conclusion
One of the major concerns of our times is to integrate economic and environmental wellbeing.
There is increasing institutional pressure on rms to be environmentally responsible. We exam-
ine two possible channels through which rms can internalize such institutional costs. Explicitly,
we investigate the advisory function of the board of directors. EEDs have skills that suits them
to provide information and strategic advise on matters related to environmental sustainability.
Similarly, boards can leverage knowledge on environmental strategies through shared director-
ships. For example, better-networked boards can improve a rms ability to respond to shocks
in environmental technology or anticipate regulatory changes on sustainability. We examine
whether board expertise and centrality in the network explain variations in the subsequent envi-
ronmental performance of rms. After controlling for endogeneity concerns, we nd that EEDs
have an economically signicant impact on GHG emissions: rms with board expertise in envi-
ronmental sustainability have lower GHG emissions. We test for alternative explanations, and
our results suggest that the e¤ect of EEDs is likely to be a specic expertise e¤ect rather than
general technical skills. We also nd that rms with better-networked directors have lower GHG
emissions. Our results also support the view that rms with better-networked directors are able
to improve performance in terms of GHG emissions through a better access to information.
In the light of the above ndings, an obvious question arises: why dont all rms appoint
EEDs given the growing importance of environmental sustainability? This could be due to a
number of reasons. First, appointment of directors with a set of specic skills has opportunity
costs. Appointing a director with environmental skills might mean keeping out a director with
7We use information on both harazardous and non-hazardous e­ uent releases to land and water.
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general or other specic skills which might be valuable to the rm. Second, if environmental
technology is industry-specic then anti-trust laws may prohibit rms competing in the same
product market to have shared directors. This constrains the supply of environmental directors
to rms. Therefore such appointments are likely to be endogenous selections where the benets
of such appointments outweighs the cost. Similarly, our ndings do not suggest that a more
connected network can lead to lower GHG emissions for all rms. Board connections are con-
strained by both demand and supply side frictions: constraints on number of board positions for
a director, number of board seats available, cost of replacement, etc. A director position within
the network also depends on director appointment in other rms, which an individual rm has
little control over. Thus not all rms can, and will attempt to improve their centrality in the
network.
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
This table shows descriptive statistics for the key variables of our sample
rms. All monetary values are expressed in constant 2010 US$.
N Mean Median Std. Dev.
ROA 3,244 7.802 6.126 6.546
Ln Sales 3,244 17.422 11.215 6.874
Leverage 3,244 0.556 0.511 0.0282
Volatility 3,244 0.039 0.044 0.021
GHG Emissions (/1000 tonnes) 3,244 2374.649 1079.810 1029.737
R&D 3,244 0.049 0.003 0.033
HHI 3,244 0.211 0.203 0.194
%Shareholding-Institutions 3,244 28.242 22.108 20.491
Board Size 3,244 8.143 7.988 2.660
% Non-Executive Directors 3,244 55.309 51.342 24.143
EED Dummy 3,244 0.094 0.000 0.144
CEO Duality 3,244 0.230 0.000 0.301
Degree 3,244 8.237 4.133 5.988
Closeness 3,244 0.286 0.202 0.026
Betweenness 3,244 0.012 0.029 0.012
Eigen Vector 3,244 0.043 0.067 0.045
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Table II. Industry Composition of the Sample
This table provides the average network centrality measures and GHG emissions of sample r
-ms, by the main industries
Industry No. of Firms Environmental GHG Degree Closeness Eigenvector
Directors (No.)
Energy 23 131 3039.281 5.982 0.122 0.057
Industrial 82 78 2812.973 9.338 0.254 0.040
FMCG 77 82 1008.653 8.979 0.231 0.047
Pharmaceuticals 31 110 1242.750 7.898 0.229 0.051
Healthcare 38 72 844.195 8.395 0.212 0.048
Utilities 23 88 1747.296 8.252 0.208 0.041
Table III. Network Summary Statistics
In this table we present the rm-level network centrality measures accross the sam
-ple period. The average network centrality measures are relatively stable over time
and the number of connections increase.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
No. of Firms 353 353 354 356 353 352 354 354
No. of Directors 1,254 1,372 1,029 1,003 950 1,026 885 961
No. of Connections 458 503 524 528 616 562 663 624
Mean Degree 6.235 6.978 6.381 6.500 6.648 6.614 6.137 5.981
Mean Closeness 0.269 0.273 0.201 0.271 0.268 0.279 0.274 0.275
Median Betweenness 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.014 0.012
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Table IV. Univariate Comparison of Firms with and without EEDs
In this table we compare rm-years with EEDs and without. Firms with EEDs have
, on average, larger boards, lower degree of connectivity, and lower GHG emission
s. ***, **, and * represent signicance at 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively. The
signicance is based on a two-tailed t-test.
Means
Firms with Firms without
EEDs EEDs Di¤erence
ROA 7.214 7.988 -0.784
Ln Sales 17.248 17.507 -0.259
Leverage 0.575 0.560 0.015
Volatility 0.034 0.040 -0.006
GHG Emissions (/1000 tonnes) 2008.120 2518.788 -510.668***
R&D 0.049 0.047 0.002
HHI 0.203 0.214 -0.011
%Shareholding-Institutions 30.018 28.503 1.515
Board Size 8.648 7.501 1.147**
% Non-Executive Directors 55.013 55.304 -0.291
CEO Duality 0.228 0.235 -0.007
Degree 7.225 8.543 -1.318**
Closeness 0.288 0.285 0.003
Betweenness 0.015 0.011 0.004
Eigen Vector 0.049 0.039 0.010
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Figure 1
This gure presents the time series of aggregate supply of EEDs and average
GHG emissions of our sample rms. There is no evidence that these two serie
-s are co-integrated. We use the supply of EEDs as an instrument for rm-lev
-el appointments of EEDs.
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Table V. Director Experience and GHG Emissions
In this table we present the baseline estimates of board expertise in environme-
tal sustainability and GHG emissions. In column 1 we use a binary indicator of
at least one director with environmental experience (EED), in column 2 we add
a binary indicator for presence of a board committee on environmental sustai-
nability, and in column 3 we further add an interaction of EED and environmen
-tal committees. The results suggest the board expertise and the presence of co-
-mmittees on environmental issues are associated with lower GHG emissions.
Robust standard errors clustered at rm the rm level is given in brackets. ***
**, and * indicate signicance at the 1%,.5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: GHG Emissions
(1) (2) (3)
EED dummy -0.027** -0.021** -0.015**
(0.013) (0.009) (0.007)
Environmental Committees -0.011** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.005)
EED * Environmental -0.029**
Committees (0.010)
%Shareholding-Institutions -0.023** -0.016** -0.011**
(0.011) (0.008) (0.005)
Board Size 0.019 0.016 0.014
(0.013) (0.012) (0.009)
% Non-Executive Directors 0.024 0.019 0.017
(0.017) (0.010) (0.013)
LogSales 0.016** 0.012 0.013
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
ROA 0.004 0.006 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Leverage -0.004 -0.000 -0.001
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
Volatility 0.008 0.006 0.006
(0.013) (0.009) (0.008)
R&D -0.019 -0.015 -0.015
(0.021) (0.017) (0.015)
CEO Duality 0.134 0.139 0.138
(0.122) (0.129) (0.116)
HHI -0.123 0.120 0.120
(0.104) (0.100) (0.108)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.221*** 0.218*** 0.206***
(0.033) (0.041) (0.059)
Observations 3,244 3,244 3,244
Adjusted-R2 0.231 0.240 0.249
30
Table VI. Director Experience and GHG Emissions: Controlling for Endogeneity
In this table we present endogeneity-adjusted results for director expertise (EED) and
GHG emissions. In table 1 we present the rst stage results with Ln (Supply per Seat)
of environmental directors as the instrument for rm level appointments of EEDs. In
columns (2)-(4) we present the di¤erent specications of the second-stage regression.
The F-stats from the rst stage is over 20, mitigating concerns about weak instrument.
The parameter estimate on the instrument is positively associated with EED appointm-
-ents, and is statistically signicant. Controlling for endogeneity the basline results hol
-d: board expertise is associated with lower GHG emissions. Robust standard errors
clustered at rm levels are given in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at 1
%,.5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variables:
EED GHG Emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln (Supply Per Seat) 0.281***
(0.079)
EED dummy -0.022** -0.021** -0.015**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
Environmental Committees -0.011** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.005)
EED * Environmental -0.029**
Committees (0.010)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.221*** 0.223*** 0.218*** 0.206***
(0.033) (0.060) (0.041) (0.059)
Observations 3,244 3,244 3,244 3,244
Adjusted-R2 0.231 0.237 0.240 0.249
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Table VII. Board Centrality and GHG Emissions
In this table we present the results of the estimates for board centrality measures and
environmental performance. Column 1 presents the results with degree centrality, wi
-thout rm and year xed e¤ects. Columns 2 - 5 present the xed-e¤ects results wi-
-th four measures of board centrality: Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, and Eigenve
-ctor. The estimate on degree is statistically signicant in column 2 but overall our
results suggest that better-networked boards have lower GHG emissions. Robust stan
-dard errors clustered at the rm level are given in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1%,.5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: GHG Emissions









%Shareholding-Institutions -0.031** -0.020** -0.019** -0.017** -0.0012**
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Board Size 0.017 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.013
(0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
% Non-Executive Directors 0.031 0.023 0.025 0.024 0.026
(0.021) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
LogSales 0.024** 0.018* 0.014* 0.012* 0.018*
(0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
ROA 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Leverage -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.002 -0.000
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
Volatility 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009)
R&D -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 -0.013 -0.014
(0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.016)
CEO Duality 0.132 0.130 0.122 0.129 0.140
(0.134) (0.122) (0.128) (0.125) (0.126)
HHI -0.126 0.127 -0.122 0.117 0.118
(0.118) (0.110) (0.108) (0.102) (0.111)
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed E¤ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.238*** 0.202*** 0.191*** 0.212*** 0.200***
(0.045) (0.033) (0.039) (0.048) (0.041)
Observations 3,244 3,244 3,244 3,244 3,244
Adjusted-R2 0.013 0.019 0.027 0.025 0.021
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Table VIII. Board Composition and GHG Emissions: Controlling for Endogeneity
In this table we present the results of the estimates for board centrality and GHG
emissions, controlling for potential endogeneous board formation. Panel A provides
estimates with subsample of rms with unchanged board composition from t  1 to
t; and panel B presents the results for subsample of rms with unchanged board
composition and rst-degree connections from t   1 to t . Robust standard errors
clustered at the rm level are given in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate signicance
at the 1%,.5% and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: GHG Emissions
Panel A: Regressions with Unchanged Board Sample
Degree -0.017 - - - -
(0.014)
Closeness - -0.035** - - -
(0.018)
Betweenness - - -0.020** - -
(0.010)
Eigen Vector - - - -0.009* -
(0.005)
EED dummy - - - - -0.011**
(0.005)
Environmental Committees - - - - -0.009**
(0.004)
EED* - - - - -0.023**
Environmental Committees (0.011)
Firm Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.191*** 0.197*** 0.186*** 0.194*** 0.207***
(0.044) (0.039) (0.051) (0.047) (0.033)
Panel B: Regressions with unchanged board and rst-degree links
Degree 0.019 - - - -
(0.013)
Closeness - 0.041** - - -
(0.20)
Betweenness - - 0.036** - -
(0.012)
Eigen Vector - - - 0.017** -
(0.008)
EED dummy - - - - 0.017**
(0.005)
Environmental Committees - - - - 0.012**
(0.004)
EED* - - - - 0.035**
Environmental Committees (0.016)
Firm Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.152*** 0.158*** 0.147*** 0.150*** 0.203***
(0.061) (0.057) (0.063) (0.072) (0.063)
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Table IX. Robustness to classications of EEDs
In this table we present the results of our robustness tests. In
column 1 we examine the e¤ect of technical expertise of dir-
ctors on environmental performance, and nd no statistically
signicant e¤ect; in column 2 we present the results for CEO
-EEDs, and in column 3 for non-CEO EEDs, separately. We
nd that both types of EEDs are associated with lower GHG
emissions. Robust standard errors clustered at the rm level
are given in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signic-
ance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.








Firm Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.179*** 0.189*** 0.206***
(0.033) (0.055) (0.065)
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Appendix I: GHG Emissions Algorithm
As a measure of rmsenvironmental performance, we use rmsGHG emission data from
the E-PRTR (Website: http://prtr.ec.europa.eu/). The E-PRTR is the Europe-wide register
that provides annual data on the amounts of pollutant releases to air, water and land from
93 key pollutants (e.g. heavy metals, pesticides, greenhouse gases and dioxins) as well as o¤-
site transfers of waste and of pollutants in waste water from 43,464 industrial facilities in the
EU Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland over the period
2007-2012. The main advantage of the register is that data is comparable across countries
and pollutants because data collection and reporting is standardised over all pollutants in all
countries. A facility is dened as n operation unit of a rm focused on a narrowly dened process
like packaging, bottling, etc.
Our original dataset downloaded from the E-PRTR website contains 561,075 observations.
Each line of the dataset reports data on one particular pollutant released/transferred by one
facility in one year as well as information about the category of the pollutant (greenhouse gas,
pesticide...) and information about the facility (e.g. address, activity sector, parent company,
etc.). As a consequence, we may have several observations for the same facility within a year if
this facility releases or transfers various types of pollutants per year. For example, the facility
with ID = 9 (Saint-Gobain Glass Polska Sp. Z o. o.) has three lines for the year 2011 in the
dataset because this facility released two types of pollutant (NOx and Cadmium) and reported
hazardous waste disposal in 2011.
As we are not interested in one particular pollutant we will aggregate pollutants in 7 cat-
egories dened on the E-PRTR website:Chlorinated organic substances, greenhouse gases (our
variable of interest), heavy metals, inorganic substances, other gases, other organic substances,
pesticides. We have also two categories for waste: hazardous and non-hazardous. Since the
harmfulness of each pollutant di¤ers and also the relative amount of each pollutant emitted
di¤ers, we cannot simply add the individual amounts of pollutant to aggregate them in these 7
categories.
Each pollutant is reported in the E-PRTR if the emitted amount exceeds a reporting thresh-
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old. The reporting thresholds are set up by the European Commission based on their impact on
human health and on the environment8 We therefore normalize the emitted amount according
to the reporting threshold and then sum these normalized amounts of pollutant belonging to
the same category for each individual facility.
We nally reshape the dataset to have only one observation per facility per year. Our dataset
has now 208,735 lines. Each line contains information on the facility (address, parent company
and economic activity code) and the amount of pollutant by category.
8See Article 5 of the E-PRTR Regulation No 166/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
January 2006 concerning the establishment of a European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register and amend-
ing Council Directives 91/689/EEC and 96/61/EC. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
L:2006:033:0001:0017:EN:PDF
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Appendix II: Board Expertise Algorithm
To identify directors with environmental expertise, we use data from BoardEx on the ed-
ucation and past expertise of directors in matters related to environmental sustainability. We
classify directors as having prior experience in environmental issues if they have served on any
of the following board level committees in a previous role:
1. Health, Safety, Security, and Environment
2. Safety and Sustainable Development
3. Sustainability and Stakeholder Management
4. Corporate Responsibility
5. Sustainability
6. Safety, Ethics, and Environmental Assurance
7. Corporate Social Responsibility
8. Sustainable and Responsible Business
9. Health, Safety, Environment and Community
10. Ethics-Compliance-Corporate Responsibility
11. Safety, Health, and Environment
12. Sustainable Development
13. Risk and CSR
14. Environment, Health and Safety
15. CSR and Regulatory Issues
16. Corporate Compliance and Responsibility
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In order to test for the robustness of our results, we also construct di¤erent measures by
random sampling of these keywords. Data on EEDs are available from the authorswebsites on
request.
Appendix III: Board Network Algorithm
The concept of centrality is multi-dimensional. In this paper, we focus on the four commonly
used measures of centrality (see Jackson, 2010 and Larcker, So, and Wang, 2013): Degree,
Eigenvector, Closeness and Betweenness. We compute these measures for each director in the
network formed by shared directorship. To aggregate these measures at the board level, we
compute the average centrality measures of the directors of the board. We discuss the relevance
of each of these measures below:
1. Degree
The simplest centrality measure is the count of the number of connections. The degree
is similar to the concept of board interlock used in the literature about the impact of board
governance. A higher degree reects more pathways to access to information, and expertise.
The degree centrality varies over time due to entry and exit of directors, and is normalised by





dij is equal to 1 if directors i and j sit on the same board and 0 otherwise.
2. Eigenvector
It can be argued that a director is more inuential when his individual connections are
also well-networked. Unlike degree, which weights every link equally, the eigenvector weights
links according to their eigenvector values. A nodeseigenvector is proportional to the sum of
the eigenvector values of all nodes directly connected to it. It is useful in determining who is






where  is the eigenvalue. In our context, it is important to measure how central a director
is in terms of its own degree but it it also important to take into account the degrees of the
directors he is connected to. If director i is connected to director j, who is very well connected
(i.e. has a high degree), then director i has a greater opportunity to get access to information
or inuence the rest of network.
3. Closeness
This measures the ease to reach other nodes or how long it will take to spread information






Where lij is the distance between directors i and j.In our network, a high closeness indicates
a director who is close to others and can therefore quickly interact and communicate with them
without going through many intermediaries. High closeness makes information transmission
quicker.
4. Betweenness
The betweenness of a node is a measure of its role as an intermediary. Formally, node i
betweenness is the sum of proportions for all pairs of nodes j and k in which node i is on the
shortest path between j and k: It is normalized by the maximum possible betweenness for the




Pi(j; k)=P (j; k)
(n  1)(n  2)=2 (6)
39
where P (j; k) is the number of shortest paths between j and k and Pi(j; k) is the number
of shortest paths between j and k that goes through i. Directors with high betweenness are on
the path of large number of information ows and as such, able to inuence a large number of
directors as well as be able to collect information quickly from many sources.
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